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THE FINALITY OF MORAL JUDGMENTS: 
A REPLY TO MRS. FOOTI 
I N A recent article,2 Philippa Foot has argued that, although people talk about the "binding force" and "inescapability" of 
morality-as contrasted with the "hypothetical" character of the . 
rules of etiquette, club rules, and the like-it is very difficult to specifY 
just what this could mean, other than that we simply have been taught 
to feel that we cannot escape from the demands of morality. "[P]erhaps 
it makes no sense," she says, "to say that we 'have to' submit to the 
moral law, or that morality is 'inescapable' in some special way."8 
The supposed inescapability or binding force or categorical character 
of morality "may tum out to be merely the reflection of the way 
morality is taught"'-that is, a reflection of the "relative stringency 
of our moral teaching."6 In fact, she holds, upon consideration of the 
failure of attempts to specifY a special sense in which moral judgments 
(as opposed to rules of etiquette) must of necessity be "inescapable" 
or binding, "[t]he conclusion we should draw is that moral judgments 
have no better claim to be categorical imperatives than do statements 
about matters of etiquette. People may indeed follow either morality 
or etiquette without asking why they should do so, but equally well 
they may not. They may ask for reasons and may reasonably refuse 
to follow either if reasons are not to be found."6 
G. J. Warnock has recently taken a similar position: 
It seems ... possible to see in, say, aesthetic objects a value for themselves, 
not merely for their place in the lives of people in general, which . . . may 
sometimes be weighed against moral values, and by some may sometimes be 
regarded as of greater weight. 
It is not possible to doubt, I believe, that such a "placing" of morality-some 
such subordination of the weight of moral reasons to others--does sometimes 
1 This paper was written while I was a Fellow of the National Endowment 
for the Humanities. I am grateful to Philippa Foot and H. L. A. Hart for 
their comments on an earlier draft. 
a "Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives," Philosophical 
Review, LXXXI (1972), 305-316. 
3 Ibid., pp. 3Il -3I2. 
4. Ibid., p. 3Il • 
I Ibid., p. 310. 
B Ibid., p. 312. 
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occur; and though possibly there may be some way of arguing that such down-
grading, so to speak, of moral considerations is "contrary to reason," I cannot 
for my own part see how such an argument would gO. 7 
I want to argue, in opposition to both Foot and Warnock, that 
there are good grounds for holding that the "finality," "binding 
force," "inescapability," or "overridingness" of moral judgments is 
more than just a contingent fact about our moral education-that, 
indeed, it is "contrary to reason" to subordinate them to (or give them 
co-ordinate status with) other sorts of normative judgments. I will 
argue that the finality or inescapability of moral judgments follows 
necessarily from the "all things considered" aspect of any thorough-
going defense of a moral judgment, as opposed to the markedly 
restricted character of a thoroughgoing defense of (say) rules of 
etiquette qua etiquette, judgments of prudence qua prudence, and 
so forth. This does not mean, of course, that people's attitudes about 
the overridingness of morality are products of contemplating the 
nature of moral reason-giving. It merely means that the sort of stringent 
moral teaching mentioned by Mrs. Foot is (at least in terms ofa highly 
plausible concept of morality) rationally defensible-indeed, that any 
teaching to the contrary would be "contrary to reason." 
Begin by considering some examples of the sorts raised by Mrs. 
Foot: 
(I) If you want to win the game, you'll have to take his rook. 
-I don't see why. 
Well, if you don't take it, then his rook captures your bishop, and. 
(2) Forks are always placed to the left of the dinner plates. 
-I don't see why. 
Because that's the way it's done. Here's a book on etiquette. 
(3) If you want to read in the library, you'll have to leave those sticky cakes 
outside. 
-I don't see why. 
It's in the rules. 
In so far as the dispute in (I) concerns only winning at chess, in 
(2) concerns only matters of etiquette, and in (3) concerns only the 
library's rules, a perfectly thoroughgoing reply to "I don't see why" 
can in each case be constructed along the lines suggested in the 
example. In (I), the reply will concern itself only with the rules and 
strategy of chess (with, perhaps, some assumptions about the opponent's 
weaknesses and strengths as a chess player). In (2), the reply will 
7 G. J. Warnock, The Object of Morality (London, 1971), p. 158. 
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focus on a description of the received practices of whatever group is 
held to be authoritative in matters of etiquette. In (3), the reply will 
turn on uncovering applicable library rules. In each case the reply 
will be made in a tightly circumscribed area of concern, and as long 
as that circumscription is not challenged ("Now see here, you're 
not just playing chess, you know; your little brother's feelings are 
involved"), an adequate reply, concluding with a judgment about 
what ought to be done, will be final. 
But it is commonplace to note that any finality possessed by 
technical oughts, prudential oughts, judgments of etiquette, and so 
forth is conditional. It is conditional upon the restriction of one's 
concerns to technique, prudence, etiquette, or whatever. When one 
"moves over" from anyone of these areas to another, or to matters 
of morality, he often finds that the ought-statement at issue is no 
longer final-indeed, that it may have to be withdrawn as an 
appropriate prescription for conduct. 
Moral oughts, on the other hand, are supposed to be unconditional: 
that is, it has been supposed that they do not need to be withdrawn 
as appropriate prescriptions for conduct, when one moves over to 
consider matters of etiquette or prudence. But how is one to show 
that such finality is a necessary feature of moral judgments-not 
just a contingent feature of our moral education? The most plausible 
argument to that end seems to me to be the following. 
The first thing to notice is that attacks on the notion of the neces-
sarily "binding" status of moral judgments presuppose (with some 
plausibility, to be sure, and some complicity from their opponents) 
that the moral point of view, moral reasons, moral justifications, and 
so on are quite separate in kind from nonmoral ones. Once that premise 
is accepted, any defender of the bindingness of moral judgments, or 
moral reasons for action, is faced with explaining why they are binding. 
And it is indeed hard to see, in the face of the sort of attack Mrs. Foot 
makes on the categorical imperative, for example, how one could 
defend the necessarily binding status of moral judgments as anything 
other than conventional. At best one might argue for the reasonableness 
of the convention. 
But it may be that the error in all this lies not in the claim of 
inescapability or categoricality, but in the claim that moral judgments 
are merely one among several mutually exclusive (or at best just 
partially overlapping) types of prescriptions for conduct. It may be 
that when one moves from considering a game of chess in various non-
moral contexts to considering it as a matter of moral concern, he has 
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not moved over to yet another kind of concern (or to asking questions 
which are answerable only in terms of another kind of reasons-moral 
reasons). Rather, one may argue with equal plausibility that the 
introduction of the moral question simply broadens the inquiry. One 
may argue that justification in terms of etiquette or club rules or 
winning technique is not irrelevant to the moral justification, or 
separate from it, but merely not sufficient for it. What the demand 
for a moral justification of an act does is to "detach" the act from 
its connection with special or restricted assumptions about what 
sorts of considerations are relevant and ask for a justification of it 
no holds barred. If that is so, then a valid moral judgment is by 
definition overriding. Its action-guidance is "inescapable" or "binding" 
in the sense that there is nothing more to consider-nothing which 
might be introduced to enlarge the inquiry further and make the 
prescription subject to withdrawal. 
Some such interpretation of moral judgments seems plausible, for 
we often say that judgments of expedience, effectiveness, etiquette, and 
so on are relevant toward a judgment about what we ought (morally) 
to do. They are relevant in so far as expedience, effectiveness, good man-
ners, and so forth are valued, or are our duties, or exemplifY virtuous 
conduct. Yet they are not in themselves sufficient to justifY a course of 
conduct as moral, for there are usually "other things to consider." 
One will be reminded very quickly, no doubt, that in common 
speech one often opposes morality to prudence, morality to efficiency, 
morality to self-seeking, and so forth. But this need not mean that 
prudence, efficiency, and self-seeking are co-ordinate spheres with, 
rather than subordinate spheres within, morality. We often speak of 
the peculiar features of one species as laid against the rest of its genus. 
That does not mean that we think the species stands outside the genus. 
It is illuminating, in this connection, to focus on the naturalness of 
stating our moral objections to other sorts of prescriptions in terms of 
our demand for an enlargement of the issue: 
"Yes, but you see you are only considering yoursel£ There are 
others to consider as well." 
"The trouble is that you think only in terms of efficiency. God 
knows that's important, but you must realize that there is more 
to it." 
"It won't do to tell me I should do something merely because 
it's the law. The rule of law is important, but there is more to 
this moral crisis than that." 
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If a shift from prudential concerns (or nonmoral concerns gen-
erally) to moral ones is an enlargement of the issue, and if it is in fact 
a shift to a completel y unrestricted frame for inquiry-where we are 
to decide what is right all things considered-then it is easy to see how 
the notion of finality or overridingness is necessarily involved with 
the very concept of a moral judgment. If to accept the validity of a 
moral judgment is to accept that "when all is said and done," when 
"everything is taken into account," such and such ought to be done, 
then one has by definition ruled out any grounds for an objection. 
There will simply be an end to argument-no more to be said. The 
moral judgment, in so far as one is committed to accepting the 
prescriptions resulting from rational deliberation, will be inescapable. 
To reject it will be to reject rationality as a ground for deciding what 
to do. 
Objection: But surely this line of argument creates a paradox. One 
is forced to say that an act's being good manners, or a winning chess 
move, or in accord with library rules is both a moral and a nonmoral 
reason for doing it. 
Reply: There is no paradox in saying that a very restricted sort of 
justification of an act is nonmoral if by "moral justification" one 
means precisely an unrestricted justification-an "all things considered" 
justification. 
Objection: But now you have departed very far from what people 
ordinarily mean by "moral" as opposed to "nonmoral." And surely 
what defenders of the overridingness of moral judgments have often 
wanted was simply to rule out considerations of expedience, etiquette, 
and so forth. 
Reply: Some philosophers have indeed appeared to treat moral 
judgments in this way. But it is very difficult to see how the position 
could be defended successfully. Our ordinary practice in moral ar-
gument clearly insists on the relevance of these nonmoral matters. 
Indeed, even the most unbending deontologists admit the relevance 
of considering consequences in deciding what to do. They merely 
protest that such considerations are not always (or perhaps ever) 
decisive. In fact, a close look at moral disputes in general supports 
this view: that what is inevitably at issue-apart from flaws oflogic-is 
some restriction on the scope of the reasons allowed to count toward 
deciding what one ought (morally) to do. The egoist restricts his 
attention to his own good. The altruist ignores some important facts 
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about human psychology. Utilitarians are said to oversimplifY. And 
so on. The sum of such objections can only mean that what we expect 
from a valid moral judgment is that it have taken everything into account 
-that it has not overlooked, or brushed aside pre-emptorily, any 
relevant sort of value, source of obligation, or virtue. 
Objection: But to make this doctrine work, you have to hold that 
a thoroughgoing moral justification always does consider everything. 
Surely you cannot believe that this is so-that there are never any 
limits to what is considered relevant to moral arguments. Think of 
situations like "I know Emily Post wouldn't approve, but etiquette 
hasn't got anything to do with this. This is serious." 
Reply: Of course there are limits on what is considered relevant to 
the justification of a moral judgment. But these need not presuppose 
the exclusion in principle (from moral justifications) of any of the 
various nonmoral reasons which might be offered for doing something. 
Clearly there are purely logical limits of relevance in any attempt 
to offer reasons. When one says moral justifications are to consider 
everything, the universe of discourse is understood to be restricted 
to reasons relevant to action-guidance and to the particular actions 
(or virtues) in question. Further, we develop other criteria of relevance 
in day to day practice: for example, "For all practical purposes, we 
may ignore considerations of etiquette in life-and-death situations." 
Such principles do not mean that considerations of etiquette (or 
whatever) are irrelevant in principle to the argument; they mean merely 
that their weight in determining a conclusion is, in certain cases, so 
minimal as to render their inclusion in the argument superfluous. 
So again there is no reason to reject the view that moral arguments 
are precisely those which, in principle, are supposed to consider 
everything. Thus the finality of moral judgments (that is, their being 
the court from which there is no rational appeal) is explained. The 
function of moral education is not to get us to think of a special sort 
of reasons (moral reasons) as being overriding. Rather, the function 
of moral education is to get us away from thinking only of ourselves, 
only of others, only in terms of prudence or efficiency, only in terms of 
personal pride, and so on. And when we have "considered everything," 
in so far as we feel bound to follow reason at all, we will feel bound 
unconditionally by the ought (the moral ought) we have reached. 
We will feel bound by it unconditionally, not because it has been 
arbitrarily drummed into our heads that a moral ought just is over-
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riding, but because there are no further conditions upon which its 
validity could possibly depend. The finality of moral judgments lies 
not in the psychological strength of the hold they have on us, but 
from the fact that their justification is entered into no holds barred. 
LAWRENCE C. BECKER 
Hollins College 
